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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a summary dismissal of Rhinehart's Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(f) (2010) and § 78B-9-110 (2010).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Point I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY NOT GIVING THE PARTIES PRIOR
NOTICE OF CONVERTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
INTO ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing the failure to convert a motion to dismiss
under rule 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment, "it is reversible error unless the
dismissal can be justified without considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill.,
L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^ 12, 104 P.3d 1226. A dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10,
H 6, 155P.3d893.
The improper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment
is plain error, requiring no preservation in the court below. Establishment of a plain error
requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000).
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Point II
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of an action on
summary judgment, the dismissal is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the
district court's conclusions. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ^ 15, 250 P.3d 56. Petitioner preserved
this matter for appeal by filing her Response to State's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 190-210.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6):
How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
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defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
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admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
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which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arose out of Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus and Post
Conviction Relief, filed on August 14, 2008. (R. 3-29.) Respondent did not file an
answer to the Petition, but filed instead a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Post Conviction Relief, on March 3, 2009. (R 67.) Respondent argued that
Petitioner did not meet her burden through her Petition and requested that the matter be
dismissed. (See, e.g., R. at 75; 81; 90; 99.) Respondent attached documents to its
Motion to Dismiss, including transcripts of the plea proceeding and the Statement in
Advance of Plea. (R 101-163.)
At the hearing, the court was uncertain of the standard to be applied to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 271: pp. 6-7.) Although Respondent stated that
the hearing should be treated as one for summary judgment, Respondent did not refer to
the summary judgment standard, but talked about the sufficiency of the pleadings. (R.
271: pg. 7.) The court determined, ultimately, that Petitioner had not met her burden to
establish the elements of her claim through a preponderance of the evidence and
dismissed Petitioner's Petition. (R. 236.) Petitioner filed this appeal. (R. 261-262.)
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 18, 2005, Petitioner, Tamra Rhinehart, pled guilty to one count of
aggravated murder in Case Number 031100633. Petitioner directly appealed her
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court on several grounds, including that she was
deprived of her right to effective assistance of counsel when she entered her guilty plea.
The Utah Supreme Court determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's
challenge to the lawfulness of her guilty plea, because she never filed a motion to
withdraw that plea.
On or about August 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Post-Conviction Relief (the "Petition"). (R. 3-29.) In the Petition, Petitioner asserted
that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel during her criminal proceedings,
particularly relative to her guilty plea. (Id.) Petitioner also alleged that she received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, who failed to raise the issue of a misplea on
direct appeal. (Id.)
Respondent, the State of Utah, requested three extensions of time in which to
respond to the Petition. (R. 50-52; 55-57; 60-62) On March 3, 2009, Respondent filed its
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief (the
"Motion to Dismiss"). (R 67.) Respondent argued in its Motion to Dismiss that
Petitioner had not "carried her burden" of establishing that her trial counsel was
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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a
a
«

a
ineffective. (See, e.g., R. at 75; 81; 90; 99.) Respondent also requested that the trial
court hold an evidentiary hearing to address any issues not resolved through its Motion to

'
m

Dismiss. (R. 99.) In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent attached a copy of the
opinion in State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, a copy of Petitioner's Statement in Advance

•

of Plea, and a transcript of the plea hearing, held on March 18, 2005. (R 101-163.)

4

Petitioner also requested several extensions of time in which to respond to the
Motion to Dismiss. (R 164; 175-176.) Respondent filed a Notice to Submit on its
Motion to Dismiss on June 29, 2010. (R. 167-168.) Petitioner filed a Request for an

•
m

Evidentiary Hearing on the Petition on June 30, 2010. (R. 169-170.) The trial court
granted Petitioner more time to file her response to the Motion to Dismiss, which

•

response was filed on or about October 19, 2010. (R. 177-179.) In her response,

m

Petitioner argued that she had met the procedural requirements to file the Petition. (R.
190-196.) Petitioner argued further that her trial counsel was ineffective, in that she was

w

coercive during pre-plea discussions and at the taking of the plea; that Petitioner did not

m

"knowingly and voluntarily" waive her right to a jury during the sentencing phase of her
case; that Petitioner was under the influence of Lexapro at the time of entry of her plea;

%

that counsel misstated information during pre-plea discussions; and that counsel failed to

**

file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea prior to sentencing. (R. 190-197.) Petitioner
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W

attached several exhibits to her response to the Motion to Dismiss, including a
photograph taken at the time of the sentencing hearing. (R. at 199.)
The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2010. (R. 232.)
Counsel for both parties was present. (Id.) Initially, Respondent indicated that it
anticipated that the court would treat its Motion to Dismiss as a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. (R. 271: pg. 5.) The court then held a conference with counsel in
chambers, where the parties discussed how Petitioner's appointed counsel would be
compensated and the "exact purpose of this hearing[.]" (R. 271: pp. 5-6.) At first, the
court indicated that the purpose of the hearing was a " 12(b)(6) review hearing to see if
the pleadings are sufficient taking everything that the petitioner is saying as true,
sufficient for an evidentiary hearing on this matter to take it essentially to the next level."
(R. 271: pg. 6.) Respondent clarified that "we've moved beyond the 12(b)(6) stage to
summary judgment stage by virtue of the attachments to the pleadings." (Id.) The trial
court indicated that "[t]he standard's the same" whether the parties proceed under
12(b)(6) or summary judgment. (R. 271: pg. 7.) The court did not offer either party an
opportunity to provide any additional evidence. (Id.)
The court took argument from the parties and then indicated that a decision would
be forthcoming. (R. 271: pp. 36-37.) The court issued its Memorandum Decision on or
about May 28, 2011. (R. 233-237.) It its decision, the trial court indicated that it "ha[d]
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reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions" along
with the oral arguments of counsel. (R. 233.) The court found "that the allegations in the
Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's
trial counsel's representation fell below and objective standard of reasonableness." (R.
234.)
With regards to Petitioner's claim that her appellate counsel was also ineffective
for failure to raise a misplea, the court found "Petitioner has failed to show that there was
c

a reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits

brief, [s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal.'" (R. 236.) The court concluded by
determining that Petitioner "failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for
relief raised in her Petition." (Id.) The court dismissed the Petition. (Id.) An order
dismissing the Petition was signed by the court on July 2, 2010. (R. 238-239.) Petitioner
filed her Notice ofAppeal on July 16, 2010. (R. 261-262.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The court erred in addressing Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition. The
court did not state whether it would include or exclude matters outside of the pleadings.
The court did not give the parties notice until the hearing that it would treat the Motion to
Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Even after stating that the standard was summary
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judgment, the court failed to apply that standard to the information before it. A review of
the Petition under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard would have resulted in a ruling that the
pleadings were sufficient to state a claim for relief.
Even if the trial court did not err in converting the Motion to Dismiss to a
summary judgment motion without providing any reasonable notice, the court failed to
apply the correct summary judgment standard. Respondent had to show that there were
no genuine issues of material facts, and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Petitioner had place several material facts in dispute through affidavits
attached to her pleadings. The court inappropriately weighed evidence and made
evidentiary determinations.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE PETITIONER PROPER NOTICE OF
ITS CONVERSION OF THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER UTAH
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6) INTO ONE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
If the court considers any materials outside of the pleadings, the court must convert the
motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12; case cite about
mandatory language in a rule or statute. A matter outside of the pleadings is "any written
or oral evidence .. .which ... substantiates] ... and does not merely reiterate what is said
in the pleadings." Oakwood Village, at ]f 12. The court is required to give both parties
reasonable notice of the conversion and a meaningful opportunity to submit pertinent
summary judgment materials to the court. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10,1{ 17, 155
P.3d 893. This is particularly important to the party against whom judgment is entered.
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977).
In this matter, the trial court gave no notice prior to the hearing as to how it would
address the matter. The court failed to make any indication as to what it would or would
not consider in the process of deciding the Motion to Dismiss. The court did not engage
in any discussion with the parties as to whether Petitioner would submit additional
information in support of a summary judgment motion. Petitioner had no "reasonable
notice" of the conversion and had no opportunity to submit additional information to the
court.
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The record is unclear as to which standard was actually applied in this matter to
reach the order of dismissal. During the January 31, 2010, hearing, the court indicated
that whether the review was under rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment, "the standard's
the same." Such an ambiguous statement cannot be considered adequate notice of the
conversion. The court itself did not articulate under which rule the hearing was to
proceed; indeed, even though the State indicated it should be a summary judgment
motion, counsel for the state cited almost exclusively to the standard under 12(b)(6).
Even the Memorandum Decision issued on or about May 27, 2010, makes no reference to
any particular standard that was applied by the court in resolving the motion, making
review of the order nearly impossible.
"Because the trial court failed to properly convert [Respondent's] rule 12(b)(6)
motion into one for summary judgment" that dismissal is subject to reversal unless the
Court determines, without referring to the matters outside of the pleadings, that Petitioner
failed to state a claim for relief. Tuttle, 2007 UT App at ^[6.
This dismissal can only be affirmed under 12(b)(6) if "it appears to a certainty that
the [Petitioner] would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of [her] claims." Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the
pleadings, not the underlying merits of the matters pled. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d
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987, 989 (Utah 1997). The issue before the lower court was "whether the [Petitioner has
alleged enough in the complaint to state a cause of action, and this preliminary question is
asked and answered before the court conducts any hearings on the case." Id
In order for Petitioner to state a claim that she received ineffective assistance of
j counsel, she must plead, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" and second,
! "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466
• U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to meet the rule 12(b)(6) standard, Petitioner does not
i have to "prove" anything; she simply has to have pled facts sufficient to state a claim for
relief. Petitioner pled multiple facts supporting that her counsel's performance was
deficient: that "she was coerced by her former trial counsel, Mary Corporon, to plead
guilty" (R. 6); that trial counsel "promised that if [Petitioner] pled guilty, the trial court
would 'definitely' sentence her with the possibility of parole" (Id.); that "after the plea
hearing, [Petitioner] repeatedly asked Ms. Corporon to file a motion to withdraw her plea,
but Ms. Corporon refused to do so" (R. 7). Petitioner further pointed out that, due to the
fact that her case was for a capital offense, the ABA Guidelines for Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases apply to the examination of
counsel's deficiencies. (R. 8.) In short, Petitioner pled sufficient facts to support the first
prong of the Strickland test, namely that counsel's performance was deficient.
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Similarly, Petitioner also adequately alleged in her Petition that appellate counsel
performed deficiently. Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel failed to raise an
argument on appeal, the misplea, in spite of evidence that supported such an argument.
Petitioner is not tested on the merits under rule 12(b)(6). She only needs to plead facts
sufficient to support a claim for relief.
With regards to the second prong of the Strickland test, Petitioner had to plead that
she was prejudiced by the deficiencies of counsel. Under her claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner alleges that but for the coercion of her trial counsel,
she would have proceeded to trial. Petitioner alleges further that had trial counsel filed
the motion to withdraw her plea, Petitioner would have been able to address deficiencies
in her plea before the appellate court. Petitioner clearly pled facts to satisfy the second
Strickland prong. See Alvarez, 933 P.2d at 990 (suggesting that allegations showing had
counsel offered proper advice that the petitioner would have acted differently suffice to
plead prejudice).
Again, Petitioner satisfied the same requirement under her claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner alleges that the claim of misplea could be
raised at any time, and that her counsel failed to do so. Petitioner further alleges that the
results would have been different, based upon the other allegations made regarding the
deficiencies of the plea.
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Petitioner's pleadings are sufficient to withstand rule 12(b)(6) review. She
adequately pled both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel.
She is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to prove her allegations. It was error for
the Court to improperly convert Respondent's Motion to Dismiss into a summary
judgment motion without giving proper notice. Because the Petition survives a rule
12(b)(6) review, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings below, giving
Petitioner an opportunity to prove her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The trial court's failure to provide adequate notice to the parties regarding the
conversion from the rule 12(b)(6) motion to on for summary judgment constitutes plain
error. Establishment of a plain error requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Holgate,
10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). The trial court did not follow the procedure outlined by
Rule 12 regarding conversion of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary
judgment. Because the conversion process is set forth in the language of Rule 12, the
error should have been obvious to the court. As demonstrated above, had the trial court
proceeded as a Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner would have prevailed.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS OUTSTANDING
As set out in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment ". . . shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Summary judgment is the process of establishing a right to judgment by law, whereby the
court evaluates all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and,
finding no genuine issues of material fact applicable to the rule of law exist, grants the
requested relief. Utah courts have explained this purpose is effectuated by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact.
Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). The mere existence of issues of fact
does not preclude summary judgment; issues must be material to the applicable rule of
law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). In determining whether
genuine issues of material fact exist, the court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389
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(Utah 1980). This does not require the court to turn a blind eye to reasonable inferences
based upon uncontested facts. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338,
345 (Utah 2000). Finally, the moving party must establish its right to judgment on
applicable law as applied to the undisputed material issues of fact. Lamb v. B & B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993).
If there are facts that are in dispute then it is not appropriate for the court to weigh
the evidence presented by the parties and proceed with a ruling without a trial. Kilpatrick
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App.,1996).
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the
credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of
evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed
issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of
trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail."
IdL at 1101 (quoting Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Moreover,
" c it only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.' " Id. (quoting Holbrook, 542 P.2d at
193) (emphasis added).
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The facts material to Petitioner's claims are: (1) whether Petitioner's counsel, at
both the trial and appellate levels, were deficient in their respective performance and (2)
whether that deficiency resulted in prejudice to Petitioner. Stated in another way, the
court should analyze whether the outcome of the scenario would have been different had
counsel not acted in a deficient manner. Respondent presented evidence that Petitioner's
plea was knowing and voluntary in the form of the transcript from Petitioner's sentencing
hearing and Petitioner's Statement in Advance of Plea (which contained much of the
same information as the sentencing hearing transcript.) Respondent relied exclusively on
these two documents in refuting Petitioner's claims, indicating that Petitioner's guilty
plea creates the presumption that the proceedings were regular and that Respondent's
pleas were "knowing and voluntary."
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed affidavits with her Petition, arguing that her
plea was not knowing and voluntary. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that her trial
counsel "coerced" her into changing her plea of guilty. Petitioner also alleged several
instances showing that her plea was not knowing and voluntary, because facts relevant to
the plea were not disclosed to her by her attorney. Further, the Petition sets forth other
instances where the plea colloquy was contradictory.
In its ruling, the trial court relied upon the transcripts of the plea hearing in
supporting the adequacy of the representation. The court cited to the picture provided by
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Petitioner, stating "the picture shows concern and comfort by her trial counsel as
Attorney Mary Corpoon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of
being 'firmly pressed' on her shoulder." (R 234.) The court concluded that Petitioner
did not provide any evidence showing that counsel's performance was unreasonable.
These findings by the court constitute a weighing of the evidence by the court,
improper on summary judgment. Petitioner raised facts via affidavit that she was
coerced. She laid out the facts that justified her feelings of coercion: her depression and
use of medication; promises made by counsel that a certain sentence was likely; that
counsel threatened her by talking about how awful death row was (in spite of the fact that
no woman had been sentenced to death in Utah); that counsel told Petitioner that she
would have to lie to the judge during the plea colloquy; that counsel incorrectly advised
her about an Alford plea; that counsel incorrectly informed her of her rights on appeal;
that counsel did not advise her appropriately regarding her waiver of jury trial at the
sentencing phase of her case. (R. 18-20.) Petitioner also relied upon these same facts
with regards to her claims that waiver of rights in her plea was unknowing and therefore
involuntary. By way of her affidavit, Petitioner placed these facts in controversy. Rather
than resolve those facts at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the court
should have denied the summary judgment motion and permitted the matter to proceed to
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hearing. By reviewing the evidence and making findings regarding it, the court engaged
in improper weighing and balancing of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court remand
the matter to the trial court with instructions that the trial court set this matter for
evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Petition.
Dated this j v

day of August, 2011.
FROERER AHLSTROM, PLLC

Ifles R. Ahls^rom
Attorneys for Appellant
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

TAMRA RHINEHART,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 080102055

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

|

Judge: Kevin K. Allen

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief. In preparation for its decision,
the Court has reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. In addition, oral
arguments were received on March 31, 2010. Having considered the forgoing, the Court issues
this Memorandum Decision.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel:
Petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. "Additionally, "proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.""
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12,f36 (Utah 2009) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1993)).
As to the first prong, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that her counsel's representation
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, at 688. Although Petitioner
argues that she was coerced into making the plea by her trial counsel and that her trial counsel
1
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mislead her about the sentence she should receive, the record does not support such contentions.
Rather, the record demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly affirmed that she had adequate
opportunity to talk with her attorneys, that she was fully satisfied with her counsel's
representation and advice received, and that she was not coerced or made promises in entering
her plea. Petitioner also fully waived her right to have Attorney Scott Williams present. In
addition, Mr. William's Affidavit acknowledges that the plea "was an appropriate resolution."
Moreover, the newspaper picture that Petitioner has submitted does not support her allegation of
coercion. Rather, the picture suggests concern and comfort by her trial counsel as Attorney Mary
Corporon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of being "firmly" pressed on
her shoulder. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that would
objectively demonstrate that her counsel's representation was unreasonable. See generally State
v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Coupled with Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the claim that her
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she was mentally or emotionally
unstable. However, this claim is also refuted by the plea colloquy. The court accepted
Petitioner's plea only after specifically addressing Petitioner's use of Lexapro and her ability to
understand the proceedings and consequences of entering her plea. Also, Petitioner represented to
the Court that she did not have any mental or emotional problems or disabilities which would
interfere with her ability to understand the proceedings. As such, Petitioner has failed to show
that her plea was unknowing and involuntary or that her counsel was ineffective by failing to stop
her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea.
Additionally, the meticulous and thorough plea colloquy done by the court accepting
Petitioner's plea, overcame any alleged deficiencies in Petitioner's trial counsel's representations
regarding the rights given up and consequences of entering her plea. Based on the foregoing, the
Court finds that the allegations in the Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. It is reasonable for trial counsel to advise a client to accept a plea offer sparing
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them a possible death sentence. Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^[37. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to
satisfy the Strickland test.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel:
Petitioner argues that her appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of
a misplea on appeal. Petitioner argues that her plea was flawed because "[s]he was under the
influence of Lexapro, extremely emotional, and collapsed during the proceeding" and because
she was not correctly informed of her rights. (Petition, 12). However, the record of the pleahearing evidences that her plea was not flawed. The court was aware that Petitioner was taking
Lexapro. The court on more than one occasion addressed the effects Lexapro had on Petitioner's
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. In all cases, Petitioner stated that the medication
did not negatively affect her. More important, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that
the Lexapro impaired her ability to enter her guilty plea. Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, f 11 (Utah
2006) (holding that "[t]he critical question is whether the drugs - if they have a capacity to
impair the defendant's ability to plea - have in fact done so on this occasion").
In most instances, . . . when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant by a
physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities. In other words, the fact
that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is receiving medication to
treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of a finding that
the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea.
Id. at f 14. It has also been established that a trial court need not, sua sponte, move for a
competency hearing when a defendant is ""coherent," "respond[s] to questions appropriately,"
and "repeatedly affirmfs]" [her] choice to plead guilty." Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^29 (quoting State
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, TJ53 (Utah 2003)). Also, Petitioner has failed to assert that the Rule 11
plea colloquy was improper as was the case in State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App. 496, ^[22 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005). (holding that the jurisdictional time limit imposed on a motion to withdraw did not
effect a court's ability to set aside a plea when the court finds that the plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily made). Rather, the plea hearing record establishes that the court determined, more
than once, that the Petitioner in tact was mentally capable of entering a plea and that such plea
Case no.080102055
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was in feet knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
As such, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for Petitioner's appellate counsel to
"fail" to assert a "misplea" claim on direct appeal. Petitioner has failed to show that there was "a
reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief,
[s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal." Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ^[25 (Utah 2008) (quoting
Smith v. Rabbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to
meet her burden under the Strickland test as to this claim.
Conclusion:
Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for relief raised
in her Petition. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. Counsel for Respondent is directed
to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this ^ 9 ~ d a y of May, 2010.
BY THE COURT:
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